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Abstract: Xenotransplantation of porcine cells, tissues and organs may be associated with the 
transmission of porcine microorganisms to the human recipient. A previous, 2009, version of 
this consensus statement focused on strategies to prevent transmission of porcine endogenous 
retroviruses (PERVs). This version addresses potential transmission of all porcine 
microorganisms including monitoring of the recipient and provides suggested approaches to 
the monitoring and prevention of disease transmission. Prior analyses assumed that most 
microorganisms other than the endogenous retroviruses could be eliminated from donor 
animals under appropriate conditions which have been called “designated pathogen-free” 
(DPF) source animal production.  PERVs, integrated as proviruses in the genome of all pigs 
cannot be eliminated in that manner and represent a unique risk. Certain microorganisms are 
by nature difficult to eliminate even under DPF conditions; any such clinically relevant 
microorganisms should be included in pig screening programs. With the use of porcine islets 
in clinical trials, special consideration has to be given to the presence of microorganisms in 
the isolated islet tissue to be used and also to the potential use of encapsulation. It is proposed 
that microorganisms absent in the donor animals by sensitive microbiological examination do 
not need to be monitored in the transplant recipient; this will reduce costs and screening 
requirements. Valid detection assays for donor and manufacturing-derived microorganisms 
must be established. Special consideration is needed to preempt potential unknown pathogens 
which may pose a risk to the recipient.  
This statement summarizes the main achievements in the field since 2009 and focus on issues 
and solutions with microorganisms other than PERV. 
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Introduction 
Xenotransplantation using pig materials may be associated with transmission of porcine 
microorganisms to the recipient. In general, most microorganisms could be eliminated by 
designated pathogen free (DPF) production of the donor animals which includes Cesarean 
section, closed containment, special precautions concerning feed and waste, excellent training 
of the staff and measures to prevent transmission of microorganisms from the staff to the 
herd. However, porcine endogenous retroviruses (PERVs) cannot be eliminated in this way 
since they are integrated in the genome of all pigs, and may produce virus particles which are 
able to infect some human cells in vitro [1]. It is important to note that only certain 
transformed human tumour cell lines can be infected by PERV derived directly from pig cells. 
However, after adaptation on human cells associated with genetic modifications, PERV also 
infects human primary cells in vitro [1, 2]. In the previous, 2009, version of this consensus 
statement [3], strategies to prevent PERV transmission were elaborated. A detailed analysis of 
risk posed by PERVs and the corresponding measures to prevent transmission was undertaken 
subsequently. In addition, other porcine microorganisms which could infect human recipients 
were studied and the risks posed by them were analyzed. Although they were thought to be 
eliminated easily by designated pathogen free production, difficulties were observed in 
generating pigs free of designated pathogens such as hepatitis virus E and herpesviruses [4-7]. 
In addition, better detection methods were developed to identify pigs free of these 
microorganisms [8, 9]. In general, if microorganisms are eliminated from the donor pig, there 
should be no need to continue to routinely monitor recipients for these specific microbes. 
With this approach, sterility of the preparation of the pig-derived transplant must be assured to 
avoid the transmission of infection to the recipient. 
 
What is new since 2009: General aspects  
Some new data have been developed since the previous version of the consensus statement 
published in 2009.  
First, clinical studies transplanting pig islet cells have been performed and no transmission of 
PERV and other microorganisms has been observed [10-16]. Among these trials was the first 
New Zealand Government-approved clinical trial of alginate-encapsulated porcine islet cell 
transplants in fourteen patients suffering hypoglycemic unawareness. Each patient received 
between 5000 and 20,000 islet equivalents as a single dose from DPF Auckland Island strain 
donor pigs. In advance of the trial, pigs and islet preparations were tested for 26 
microorganisms (15 viruses, 10 bacterial species, and one protozoan) using molecular and 
immunological assays. Recipients were found to be negative on testing for PERVs and other 
microorganisms at multiple time points up to 1 yr following transplantation [16]. In addition, 
it has been reported that patients receiving viable pig skin demonstrate strong IgG responses 
to pig antigens but lack evidence of PERV infection up to 35 years post treatment. This is the 
longest time studied after xenotransplantation and shows that exposure to pig cells elicits a 
response, but more importantly, exposure evidently did not lead to infection [17].  
Second, hepatitis E virus (HEV) and herpes viruses have been found in numerous animals 
even under SPF conditions using highly sensitive detection methods [6, 18-25]. The risk 
posed by HEV is difficult to evaluate. Only genotype (gt) 3 is associated with zoonotic 
transmission and severity of infection is dependent on a number of host factors [24].  There 
appears to be little clinical risk for healthy individuals; in some regions up to 56% of the adult 
population has been exposed to the virus as shown by detection of HEV-specific antibodies 
[19, 24].  There is great variation in the epidemiology of HEV and the risk posed to transplant 
recipients remains to be fully clarified in clinical studies. HEV gt 1 and 2 represents the 
greatest risk in pregnant women. In hyper-endemic gt1 and gt2 areas, pregnant women are at 
higher risk for severe disease and death, but this feature has not yet been reported for HEV 
gt3 infections. In pigs only gt3 and gt4 were found. HEV is also of risk for patients with 
underlying chronic liver conditions and immunosuppressed individuals, either by the human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or by pharmaceutical immunosuppression in the context of 
transplantation [24-32]. Transmission of HEV via xenotransplantation has not been 
demonstrated and more studies are required to clarify any risks. It should be noted that the 
virus may be treated by the use of ribavirin based on studies of small numbers of 
immunosuppressed allotransplant recipients [33, 34]. Using newly developed highly sensitive 
methods, HEV gt3 was also detected in Göttingen Minipigs produced under spf conditions 
[8]. This may be explained by the finding that HEV can be transmitted from mothers to their 
piglets [8]. To improve the detection of PCMV also new detection methods were developed 
und used for screening [9]. 
 
What is new since 2009: PERV update  
Although PERVs can infect (non-productively) cells of non-human primates (NHP) in vitro 
[35-38], transplantations of porcine tissues [39-42] and inoculations with highly concentrated 
PERV preparations under immunosuppression [43] into NHP in vivo demonstrated no PERV 
transmission or infection, respectively. However, later investigations demonstrated that the 
major receptor for PERV-A is mutated in NHP and therefore the infection is not efficient 
[44]. This means that NHP do not represent a suitable model to be used for determination of 
the risk of transmission of PERV [45].  
Sequencing of the pig genome [46, 47] and analysis of the prevalence [48-50] and expression 
[50] of PERVs in different pig breeds have shown the heterogenous nature of PERV 
distribution and differences between individual animals as well as breeds. With this in mind, 
simple screening for PERV loci cannot be applied routinely to all donor animals. However, 
this approach also provides an opportunity to select pigs with a lower expression of PERV-A 
and PERV-B if desired. 
Improved methods allow better screening for PERV, both in the donor animals as well as in 
the human recipient (Table 1). Based on the fact that the human-tropic PERV-A, which is 
present in all pigs, can recombine with the ecotropic PERV-C, not present in all pigs, the 
selection of PERV-C-free animals may reduce the risk of PERV transmission to human 
recipients. Recombinant PERV-A/Cs are characterized by higher replication rates [51]. 
However, it is still unclear whether the exclusion of PERV-C positive animals to avoid 
recombination between PERV-A and PERV-C is important. There are no data that indicate 
any PERV infection in human recipients receiving donor islets from PERV-C positive 
animals [16].  
Several restriction factors were characterized to be of particular importance for the replication 
of retroviruses: TRIM5, which disrupts the viral capsid after cell entry; TRIM28, which 
blocks viral transcription; ZAP (zinc-finger antiviral protein), which directs degradation of 
viral RNAs; tetherin, which traps virions on the surface of infected cells, and APOBEC 
(apolipoprotein B mRNA-editing catalytic polypeptides), which are cytidine deaminases that 
disrupt viral DNA during synthesis [52, 53]. Although PERV-A and PERV-A/C are 
insensitive to restriction by TRIM5 molecules [54], overexpression of either human or 
porcine tetherin in pig cells significantly reduced PERV production [55]. In addition, human 
and porcine APOBEC3s could inhibit PERV replication [56-58], thereby reducing the risk of 
potential infection of human cells by PERV in the course of pig-to-human 
xenotransplantation. Further studies of antiviral restriction systems may help to develop 
therapeutic agents to regulate expression of these factors and to enhance antiviral activities.  
To summarize, it is still unclear whether PERVs represent a risk in clinical 
xenotransplantation. No transmission of PERVs has been observed in multiple clinical trials 
enrolling more than 200 patients or up to 35 years post xenotransplantation [1, 10, 11, 16, 17]. 
However, most of the patients in the clinical trials were not exposed for a prolonged period to 
the xenotransplants and with some exceptions (associated with parallel kidney 
allotransplantation), no immunosuppression was applied. In addition, preclinical pig to non-
human primate (NHP) transplantations, or infection experiments in small animals or NHP 
with or without pharmaceutical immunosuppression have not demonstrated infection [1, 37, 
39-43]. It is meanwhile clear that NHP are not a suitable model to study the risk of PERV 
transmission since NHP carry – in contrast to humans – a mutated receptor for PERV 
allowing infection only with reduced affinity [44, 45]. Therefore, the question whether 
PERVs may be transmitted during xenotransplantation remains open. However, the 
availability of numerous sensitive and specific detection methods allows testing of the donor 
pigs and selection of suitable animals as well as screening of the xenotransplant recipients to 
detect a possible transmission very early. Indeed, selection of pigs free of PERV-C and with 
low expression of PERV-A and PERV-B is possible due to these excellent methods. 
Available antiretroviral agents have been shown to have activity against PERV in vitro [59-
62]. Furthermore, genetic modification of donor pigs to exclude PERV loci, development of 
vaccines and other preventive strategies may be available in the near future. The potential 
viability of clinical xenotransplantation has resulted in continued investigation supported by 
the U.S. Public Health Service and the continued interest in the development of appropriate 
guidelines by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the European Medicines 
Agency (EMA). The first clinical trials of pig islet cell transplantation received regulatory 
approval in New Zealand [16] and in Argentina (Denner et al., in preparation) without 
reported adverse events. Strategies to reduce the expression of PERV by siRNA or to knock-
out PERV by ZFN, TALENs, CRISPR/Cas technologies are under development. The present 
data indicate that - when using donor animals well characterized concerning PERVs and 
sensitive detection methods - PERVs are unlikely to provide a public health security risk in 
clinical xenotransplantation. 
Most importantly, recent findings demonstrate that 62 genomic copies of PERV could be 
inactivated in an immortalised pig cell line by gene editing using CRISP/Cas9 [63].  This 
technology may be used in the future to derive porcine stem cells and embryos free of 
infectious endogenous retrovirus as well as to introduce desirable traits governing metabolic 
and immune functions.  The impact of this advance remains to be explored [64].  Attempts to 
inactivate PERV sequences in pig cells by gene editing using another nuclease, ZNF, failed 
[65].   
 
Open questions 2016 
The main question is: For which microorganisms should the recipient be monitored after 
xenotransplantation? The general consensus is that there is no need to monitor for pig-derived 
microorganisms absent in the donor pig. This assumes that available assays used in donor 
screening have the sensitivity required to avoid transmission of potential pathogens to 
immunosuppressed recipients. Assay validation might be examined in pre-clinical and clinical 
studies.  This also requires the absence of infection during handling and transport. For animals 
free of known potential zoonotic pathogens, routine screening for PERV and, on the basis of 
clinical signs and symptoms, unknown pathogens, would be required.  The methods to detect 
PERVs in the recipients are the same as used for pig screening (Table 1).  
Potential infection by unknown or emerging microorganisms is interesting and remains a 
research endeavor. With new methods, e.g., next generation sequencing (NGS) including 
RNA sequencing, many new viruses or other microorganisms may be detected which are, as 
yet, of unknown clinical significance.  For example, several novel astroviruses, bocaviruses 
and Ljungan-like viruses were identified in stool samples from healthy pigs in China, using 
high-throughput sequencing [66]. In a similar approach kobuviruses, rotaviruses, astroviruses, 
enteroviruses, sapoviruses, picobirnaviruses and a novel, previously unknown, virus, PigSCV, 
were detected in faeces of German pigs [67]. A new porcine parvovirus was recently 
described in U.S. pigs [68]. A long-term archiving of clinical specimens from donor swine 
and recipients was proposed; the optimal duration and modalities for such a repository remain 
to be described. The proficiency of the clinical laboratories charged with testing donor and 
recipient samples is essential to assure both researchers and the public regarding the 
stringency of clinical safeguards. This may require advanced, accredited (e.g., GLP) 
laboratories available in major academic centers or Contract Research Organizations (CROs) 
and needs authorization by the competent regulatory authorities. Such laboratories must have 
the capacity also to test samples for human organisms that may infect transplanted porcine 
cells and tissues. Many recipients will have prior serological and clinical data available to 
indicate prior exposures to latent or persistent organisms such as the herpesviruses, hepatitis B 
or C viruses, HIV, or HEV. It is not known whether such pathogens will infect islets or 
encapsulated islets – such studies are required if the organism has the capacity to infect 
porcine cells in vitro or in vivo. The infectious challenge posed by encapsulated cells and 
tissues in non-immunosuppressed recipients may be less than that in immunosuppressed 
recipients of cellular or vascularized xenotransplants. Additional information may be obtained 
through use of standardized WHO questionnaires for recipients to indicate any changes in 
health status and the use of the ‘precautionary principle’ [69]. That is to be prepared in 
advance for the identification, evaluation, and response to infectious syndromes. The 
monitoring of close contacts of the recipients should not be required unless data exist to 
demonstrate that the recipient is infected. It is not generally considered that transmissible 
spongiform encephalitis is a likely concern for islet xenotransplantation and is not a 
consideration of current WHO pathogen lists since there are no indications for prions in pigs. 
In contrast, prion transmission has been discussed in the context of islet allotransplantation 
[70]. 
 
Emerging viral concerns 
As mentioned above, it appears that the potential for emerging viruses from donor or recipient 
would be of concern in the absence of other potential zoonotic pathogens [5]. In islet cell 
allotransplantation, a number of transmissions have been documented, the most common 
pathogens being CMV and enteroviruses; other viruses including HIV-1, HCV, lymphocytic 
choriomeningitis virus (LCMV), and rabies virus have been transmitted from organ donors to 
recipients [71-78]. To date no emerging viral disease, as has been seen for human solid organ 
transplantation [75] has been documented in islet cell allo- or xenotransplantation [5]. In this 
context the zoonotic potential of arenaviruses has been discussed [79]. Recognition of novel 
infections in immunosuppressed hosts can be difficult as the manifestations of infection 
including inflammation may be absent. Given that encapsulation of islets may reduce or 
negate the need for clinical immunosuppression of the recipient, the likelihood of infection 
may be reduced and any organ-derived infection may be more clearly recognized. As 
discussed above, routinely applied NGS or RNA-sequencing could potentially identify 
novel/unknown pathogens to provide a microbiologic diagnosis. 
With regard to PERV, as already reported in the consensus statement of 2009, different 
strategies have been developed to increase viral safety largely by preventing transmission of 
PERV. These strategies include vaccine development [80-84], RNA interference to knock 
down the PERV expression [85-87] and directed nuclease (e.g. ZFN, TALENs, 
CRISPR/Cas9)-based knock out of PERV [63-65, 88, 89]. However, due to lack of PERV 
transmission the value of these techniques in a clinical setting has yet to be evaluated.  
The clinical application of gene editing technology to the enhancement of xenotransplant 
safety is presently unknown.  Other approaches to donor genetic modification (e.g., breeding) 
and to the reduction in infectious risk (e.g., monitoring, encapsulation) may also serve to 
enhance clinical safety and are under investigation. 
 
 
Table: Methods to be used to detect microorganisms in the donor pig and if necessary in the 
recipient 
Method What can be detected 
Direct detection methods  
PCR, real-time PCR DNA microorganisms 
RT-PCR, real-time RT-PCR RNA microorganisms, gene expression 
Immunofluorescence, , Immunohistochemistry, 
Western blot analysis 
Protein expression 
Electron microscopy Microorganisms 
Indirect detection methods  
ELISA, Western blot analysis Detection of antibodies 
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